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INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2015, the Tennessee legislature debated and
passed the "Victim Life Photo Act," which went into effect on July 1,
2015.1 This law states: "In a prosecution for any criminal homicide, an
appropriate photograph of the victim while alive shall be admissible
evidence when offered by the district attorney general to show the
general appearance and condition of the victim while alive."2 Victims'

1.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-103(c) (2015).

2.

Id. (emphasis added).
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rights groups lobbied for this and similar laws throughout the country,
which were then enacted by state legislatures.3 Though these laws
amended rules of evidence, the considerations under which they were
passed were largely normative, emotional, and based on concerns for
4
victims' families in the trial process.
In general, living-victim photographs have very low relevance.
Often the only issues they demonstrate in a homicide case are the
identity of an individual and that he or she was once alive, neither of
which is often contested. 5 Thus, with little to no relevance, in-life photos
are often introduced into evidence for the same reason that these laws
were passed: to humanize the victim, appease grieving family members,
and "elicit emotions of bias, sympathy ...[and] retribution in the jury."6
As such, these photographs would be-and often have beenexcluded from evidence during a trial as lacking relevance or being
unfairly prejudicial under a Rule 403 balancing test. 7 New waves of
state legislation, however, have eviscerated these balancing
considerations, taking admissibility determinations out of the hands of
8
judges and legislatively mandating that these photos be admissible.
Though a trial judge may have some discretion to mandate that the
photo be "appropriate," a victim's photo can no longer be excluded based
on relevance and unfair prejudice alone: the legislature has
preemptively determined its admissibility. 9 This represents a dramatic
and troubling shift because evidentiary regimes are designed with

3.

Three other states have enacted similar statutes. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2403 (West

2003) ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... However, in a prosecution for any criminal
homicide, an appropriate photograph of the victim while alive shall be admissible evidence when
offered by the district attorney to show the general appearance and condition of the victim while
alive."); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.415 (West 1987) ("In a prosecution for any criminal homicide, a
photograph of the victim while alive shall be admissible evidence when offered by the district
attorney to show the general appearance and condition of the victim while alive."); UTAH CODE

ANN. § 77-38-9(7) (West 2014) ("In any homicide prosecution, the prosecution may introduce a
photograph of the victim taken before the homicide to establish that the victim was a human being,
the identity of the victim, and for other relevant purposes.").

4.
See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
5.
State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 657 (Tenn. 2013) ("[T]he photographs taken of the
victim at the crime scene amply sufficed to prove her existence. The issue of [her] life or existence
was not a matter of dispute at trial.").

6.

State v. Collins, 986 S.W.2d 13, 20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

7.
8.

See infra Section II.A (discussing Rule 403 and these balancing considerations).
See infra notes 131-135, 139-143 and accompanying text.

9.

See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
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judicial discretion as a fail-safe to ensure that criminal defendants
10
receive a fair trial.
Though blanket admissibility of living-victim photographs may
not appear to create the most damaging unfair prejudice against a
defendant, when used in the guilt phase of murder trials, any potential
unfair prejudice should be a cause for grave concern-presumably this
is why trial judges in Tennessee and elsewhere routinely excluded these
photos.1"
The stakes for defendants are highest in criminal homicide
trials, and because these trials take place almost exclusively in state
courts, state court rules of evidence dictate the terms of the trial and
influence the outcome. 1 2 Concerns about unfairness, improper
considerations, and prejudice seeping into trials should be most
heightened where a defendant's life may be on the line.1 3 Additionally,
it is equally, if not more, troubling that admissibility determinations
are being mandated not by trial judges, but by state legislators at the
behest of disgruntled citizens whose primary concern is "justice" for
victims rather than due process for defendants.
This Note explores the problems in this rising yet underexplored
trend in state evidence law, demonstrating the evidentiary, normative,
and constitutional problems with living-victim photo statutes. Part I
introduces the push for victim-photo legislation by victims' rights
groups, using Tennessee's Victim Life Photo Act as a case study. Part
10. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach to the
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV. 267, 289 (1993) (discussing the
importance of judicial discretion). Indeed, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, there is only one
narrow exception to probativity/prejudice balancing: prior crimes of deceit committed by the
defendant that are less than ten years old. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
11. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 657 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Strouth, 620 S.W.2d
467, 472 (Tenn. 1981); State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tenn. 1981) ("[I]t would have been
better had the 'before' picture of [the victim] been excluded since it added little or nothing to the
sum total of knowledge of the jury."); see also People v. Daughtry, 610 N.Y.S.2d 54, 54-55 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994) (noting that living-victim photos are often irrelevant to facts at trial); Ritchie v.
State, 632 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (finding error in admission of photograph of
victim while alive).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Drury, 344 F.3d 1089, 1101 (1lth Cir. 2003) ("Murder ... is a
quintessential example of a crime traditionally considered within the States' fundamental police
powers."); see also C.J. Williams, Making a Federal Case out of a Death Investigation, U.S. ATT'YS'
BULL.:
VIOLENT
CRIMES
(Jan.
2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/
legacy/2012/01/26/usab6001.pdf [https ://perma.cc/9BE7-GUNW] (discussing the limits on federal
jurisdiction over murder cases and listing examples of federal homicide crimes, such as murderfor-hire and murder on federal land).
13. All four states identified in this Note with living-victim photo admissibility laws have
the death penalty. States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July
1, 2015), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty
[http://perma.cc/
K8XS-AZLE].
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II shows that such laws have the purpose and effect of eliminating
judicial discretion to exclude living-victim photos. The Part first
demonstrates that the traditional evidentiary tenets of relevance and
unfair prejudice encapsulated in Rule 403 counsel that living-victim
photos should rarely be admitted. It then establishes that these victimphoto statutes have the purpose of eliminating discretion, but have had
the effect of creating Rule 403 balancing that is problematically skewed
(i.e., "403 purgatory.") 14 Part III argues that courts must "use it or lose
it"-they must meaningfully exercise discretion as to living-victim
photos or invalidate these laws, as eliminating judicial discretion
violates defendants' due process rights.

I. TENNESSEE: A CASE STUDY
The admissibility of living-victim photographs in homicide trials
has not always been clear-cut. 15 Historically, jurisdictions have taken
varied approaches to these photos' evidentiary weight and
appropriateness in the courtroom.1 6 Though the case law of jurisdictions
has varied across time, the evidentiary foundation remained the same:
judges engaged in the universal, well-founded practice of weighing the
probative value of the proposed evidence against its risk of unfair
prejudice, a practice known as a "403 test," earning its moniker from
17
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The 403 test is one of the most ubiquitous rules of evidence,
finding its root in the common law and having a counterpart in all fifty

14. See infra Section II.B.2.
15. The statutes and approaches explored in this Note deal only with admissibility of livingvictim photos during the guilt phase of homicide trials. For a discussion of the admissibility of
victim impact statements (which can include photographs) in the sentencing phase of homicide
trials, see Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof,and Prejudice: Cognitive Science
of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1033-48 (2014).
16. Compare People v. McClelland, 350 P.3d 976, 985 (Colo. App. 2015) ("Because the three
'in life' photographs had almost no probative value, and because the prosecutor sought to elicit the
jury's sympathy based on those photographs . . . we conclude that the admission of the three 'in
life' photographs unfairly prejudiced McClelland."), and Commonwealth v. Rivers, 644 A.2d 710,
716 (Pa. 1994) (admission of living-victim photograph was error due to its purpose of "engendering
sympathy for the victim with the intent of creating an atmosphere of prejudice against the
defendant"), with United States v. Pettigrew, 468 F.3d 626, 638 (10th Cir. 2006) ("A photograph of
a victim while living is admissible to prove the identity of the victim ... the Government [has] the
burden to establish the identity of the victim.").
17. FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.").
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states.1 8 This balancing test's invocation of judicial discretion serves as
a backdrop to all evidentiary determinations.1 9 When undertaking a
403 balancing test, a judge examines the proposed evidence, determines
its logical bearing on the case at hand, and balances that consideration
against the risk that the evidence would inflame the jury, cause them
to improperly use their emotions to assess the accused's guilt, or
otherwise distract them from the relevant issues in the case. 20 Rule 403
is widely considered to be the most fundamental exclusionary principle
21
in evidence.
In Tennessee prior to 2015, photographs of victims while they
were alive were often excluded in the guilt phase of homicide trials
under the 403 balancing test.22 Tennessee judges found such photos
"typically lack relevance to the issues on trial" and that they have the
"potential to unnecessarily arouse the sympathy of the jury."23 Thus,
judicial discretion counseled for their exclusion. 24 In response to this
exclusion, victims' rights groups in Tennessee and other states began
lobbying legislatures to adopt laws facilitating the admissibility of
25
living-victim photos of victims in homicide trials.
In Tennessee, the victims' rights group Tennessee Voices for
Victims proposed a piece of legislation entitled the "Victim Life Photo

18.
See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 290 (discussing the codification of the Federal Rules
of Evidence).
19.

MCCORMICKON EVIDENCE 1005 (7th ed. 2013).

20.

See FED. R. EVID. 403 and advisory committee's note.

21.
Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 289 ("It is imperative that any body of Evidence law
accord the trial judge a significant measure of discretion in applying the Rules ... Rule 403 is the
most obvious conferral of discretionary authority.").
22.
See, e.g., State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 657 (Tenn. 2013) (holding living-victim
photograph inadmissible); State v. Strouth, 620 S.W.2d 467, 472 (Tenn. 1981); State v. Dicks, 615
S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tenn. 1981); State v. Richardson, 697 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985)

(same).
23.

Adams, 405 S.W.3d at 657.

24.

Id.

25.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2403 (West 2003) ("Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ....
However, in a prosecution for any criminal homicide, an appropriate photograph of the victim
while alive shall be admissible evidence when offered by the district attorney to show the general
appearance and condition of the victim while alive."); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.415 (West 1987)
("In a prosecution for any criminal homicide, a photograph of the victim while alive shall be
admissible evidence when offered by the district attorney to show the general appearance and
condition of the victim while alive."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-9(7) (West 2014) ("In any homicide
prosecution, the prosecution may introduce a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide
to establish that the victim was a human being, the identity of the victim, and for other relevant
purposes.").
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Bill." 26 The Tennessee legislature passed the bill, which states: "In a

prosecution for any criminal homicide, an appropriate photograph of
the victim while alive shall be admissible evidence when offered by the
district attorney general to show the general appearance and condition
of the victim while alive." 27 Laws such as this are emblematic of the rise
in victims' rights movements and victims' increasing role in criminal
28
trials across the country.
Tennessee Voices for Victims made a concerted effort to lobby
state legislators to support its proposed bill. 29 During the legislative
process, the group advocated for the bill's passage at Criminal Justice
Committee meetings holding photos of slain loved ones.3 0 One mother
of a homicide victim stated, "I don't understand what the negativity is,
where we can't allow [photos] because sympathy of the jury. Excuse me,
the jury needs to see the person before they were murdered, not just
after."31 Another stated, "I strongly believe that I deserve the right to
show the jury the person my son was when he was alive. They deserve
to see [my son] as a bright, vibrant happy young man on the cusp of his
32
adulthood."
The bill did face some legislative resistance-for example, one
state representative argued at a Criminal Justice Committee hearing
that "[w]e don't want to let emotions impede on our policy of making
decisions ... we may not do exactly what y'all want to hear today."33
However, this was not enough to counteract the emotive power of justice
for those killed and sympathy for their families.2 4 As another state
26.

Victim

Life Photo Bill, TENN. VOICES

FOR VICTIMS,

http://tnvoicesforvictims.org/

calendar/victim-life-photo-bill/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) [perma.cc/T5Y7-6W8B].
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-103(c) (2015) (emphasis added).
28. See Bennett L. Gershman, ProsecutorialEthics and Victims' Rights: The Prosecutor's
Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 559 (2005) (discussing the rise in victims'

involvement in criminal trials and their previous absence of involvement).
29. For example, besides sponsoring the legislation, the group's Facebook page includes posts
encouraging individuals to contact their state representatives to advocate for the bill. See
Tennessee Voices for Victims, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/tnvoicesforvictims/photos/a

.502240276498881.1073741826.476388519084057/87543350584622 1/?type=3&theater
(last
visited Jan. 16, 2016) [perma.cc/F9J8-5EMZ].
30. Dennis Ferrier, Bill Would Require Judges to Allow Murder Victims'Photo to be Shown
to Jurors, WSMTV NASHVILLE, http://www.wsmv.com/story/28606255/bill-would-require-judges-

to-allow-murder-victims-photo-to-be-shown-to-jurors#ixzz3xQuMWnYl
[perma.cc/HH7K-JNZ2].
31. Id.
32.

(last visited Jan. 16, 2016)

Survivor Spotlight, TENN. VOICES FOR VICTIMS, http://tnvoicesforvictims.org/survivor-

spotlight/ (last visited June 19, 2016) [http://perma.cc/DF47-436A].
33.

See Ferrier, supra note 30.

34. Id. Rep. William Lamberth argued, "I'm not trying to jerk on your heartstrings, but every
one of those folks was killed. From a policy standpoint, for God's sakes, why can't that picture be
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representative stated, "[T]his legislation allows a jury to see what the
victim looked like as a living, breathing human being with a family who
loved them." 35 Tennessee enacted the bill, and it went into effect on July
1, 2015.

II. THE ABSENCE OF DISCRETION
The following Part will demonstrate that the Victim Life Photo
Act and similar statutes have the purpose and effect of eliminating
judicial discretion to exclude living-victim photos. It does so by showing
that, under normal evidentiary tenets, living-victim photos generally
have little to no relevance while carrying high attendant risks of unfair
prejudice. Thus, under a traditional approach, judges should-and
often do-exercise discretion to exclude these photos from evidence.
Indeed, victim photo statutes were a direct reaction to this judicial
discretion to exclude living-victim photos-they were lobbied for and
enacted with the purpose of removing discretion. The result in some
instances, however, has been the creation of a "403 purgatory" in which
the legislature has mandated admissibility of living-victim
photographs, but judges purport to retain judicial discretion to exclude
them under a hobbled version of Rule 403 in which the photos are
always admitted.
A. The Traditional Approach
Similar to its federal counterpart, 36 relevance under Tennessee
evidence rules "means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." 37 Though relevance is a lenient test, it is intended to be
tempered by balancing a piece of evidence's probative value against its
potential unfair prejudice. 3 8 Unfair prejudice arises when "the primary
shown? . . . Somebody's dead and they loved them. They mattered. They're the only thing that
matters." Id.
35. Ken Little, Bill Aims to Show Victims as More than a Corpse, GREENVILLE SUN (June 20,
2015), http://www.greenevillesun.com/news/local-news/bill-aims-to-show-victims-as-more-than-acorpse/article-f6baa029-b8d3-546e-85d9-f968cfc27db7.html [http ://perma.cc/4TX5-PBUY].
36. FED.R.EVID.401.
37.

TENN. R. EVID. 401.

38. TENN. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence maybe excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.").
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purpose of the evidence at issue is to elicit emotions of bias, sympathy,
hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror."39 An evidentiary analysis of
living-victim photos in homicide trials leads to the conclusion that they
have little, if any, relevance. Therefore, when compared to the potential
for unfair prejudice, evidentiary theory would counsel that these photos
should be excluded.
This was the position that Tennessee courts took prior to the
enactment of the Victim Life Photo Act, which reversed this
presumption of exclusion.4 0 Utah, Oregon, and Oklahoma similarly
enacted living-victim photo acts in response to routine judicial exclusion
of victim photographs at trial. 4 1 Courts in many states, however, still
hold this general presumption of exclusion, 42 while some state courts
routinely admit such photos. 43 Nonetheless, though there are varied
precedents in states without living-victim statutes, no state has a per
se inadmissibility rule. 44 Instead, judges in states not constrained by
statute engage in the typical two-pronged approach of assessing unfair

39.
State v. Collins, 986 S.W.2d 13, 20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 182-83 (2d ed. 1986)).
40.
Compare State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 657 (Tenn. 2013) (living-victim photos
inadmissible), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-103(c) (2015) (living-victim photos "shall be
admissible").
41.
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2403 (West 2003) ("Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ....
However, in a prosecution for any criminal homicide, an appropriate photograph of the victim
while alive shall be admissible evidence when offered by the district attorney to show the general
appearance and condition of the victim while alive."); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.415 (West 1987)
("In a prosecution for any criminal homicide, a photograph of the victim while alive shall be
admissible evidence when offered by the district attorney to show the general appearance and
condition of the victim while alive."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-9(7) (West 2014) ("In any homicide
prosecution, the prosecution may introduce a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide
to establish that the victim was a human being, the identity of the victim, and for other relevant
purposes.").
42.
See, e.g., People v. Daughtry, 610 N.Y.S.2d 54, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) ("[P]hotographs
of a victim taken while he or she is alive may arouse the jury's emotions and, therefore, should not
be admitted unless relevant to a material fact to be proved at trial."); Commonwealth v. Story, 383
A.2d 155, 160 (Pa. 1978) (noting general lack of relevance of living-victim photos).
43.
See, e.g., Drane v. State, 455 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. 1995); State v. Aswegan, 331 N.W.2d 93
(Iowa 1983); State v. Walker, 845 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1993); Commonwealth v. Nadworny, 486 N.E.2d
675 (Mass. 1985); State v. Mergenthaler, 868 P.2d 560 (Mont. 1994); State v. Ryan, 409 N.W.2d
579 (Neb. 1987); State v. Brown, 293 S.E.2d 569 (N.C. 1982); State v. Ash, 526 N.W.2d 473 (N.D.
1995); State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14 (R.I. 1991); State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29 (Wash. 1995).
44.
State v. Broberg, 677 A.2d 602, 608 (Md. 1996) ("We have found no jurisdiction, however,
that has adopted a per se rule barring the use of 'in life' photographs. When appellate courts have
disapproved the admission of 'in life' photographs, they have generally either found that the
photographs were irrelevant, or that their probative value in the particular case was outweighed
by their prejudicial effect.").
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prejudice as compared to probative value. 45 This allows judges to make
individualized, discretionary determinations and vary their evidentiary
rulings based on the unique circumstances of the case before them.
States that have living-victim photo statutes have taken away this
balancing consideration, as discussed in Section II.B.
1. Low Relevance
Discretion determines what gets excluded, but relevance
determines initial admissibility. 46 Federal Rule of Evidence 401, which
defines relevance, states, "Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
47
evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action."
Proffered evidence must be relevant, as "n]one but facts having
rational probative value are admissible." 48 McCormick aptly
summarizes relevance as asking whether "the evidence offered render
the desired inference more probable than it would be without the
evidence ....Relevant evidence then, is evidence that in some degree
advances the inquiry, and thus has probative value, and is prima facie
admissible."49
Under this inquiry, therefore, relevant evidence must also be
material to be admitted: that is, the fact to which the evidence points
must be "of consequence." 50 This materiality inquiry asks whether the
fact the evidence seeks to prove is "necessary to a decision of the case
before the court." 51 Materiality, therefore, is distinct from the inquiry of
relevancy, though a proffered piece of evidence must meet both prongs
52
to avoid exclusion as irrelevant.
A photo depicting a murder victim while alive often has no
relevance. 53 Absent particularized circumstances, the image of an
individual while he or she was alive does nothing to make a fact "more
or less probable," as it does not tie the defendant to the underlying
45.

Id.

46.

See FED. R. EVID. 401.

47. Id.
48.
1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 9 at 289 (3d ed. 1940).
49. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185 at 437-38 (2d ed. 1972).
50. See id.
51. Harry P. Thompson Jr. & Thomas J. Leittem, Evidence Admissibility The Common
Denominator, 31 Mo. L. REV. 516, 530 (1966).
52. For a thoughtful discussion of these two prongs of relevancy and their frequent confusion,
see Herman L. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385,
386 (1952).
53. See Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 160 (Pa. 1978) (noting lack of relevance).

1432

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:5:1423

crime. 54 An illustration helps explain this. Consider that at trial, the
prosecution shows the portrait of a child who was allegedly killed by a
neighbor-the image of that child does nothing to make it more or less
likely that neighbor was responsible for the crime and does not make
any material fact in the case more or less likely. The court in
Commonwealth v. Story summed up the basic idea of relevance, stating,
"[T]he [photograph] in question was totally irrelevant to the
determination of appellant's guilt or innocence. It was therefore
unnecessary for the trial court to determine whether the probativeness
55
outweighed the prejudice."
There are times, however, when a photo of the victim while they
were alive may be relevant because it makes an issue in the case more
or less probable. 56 For example, in Grandisonv. State, a photograph of
the victim while she was alive was relevant because the defendant
allegedly committed a murder-for-hire but killed the wrong target,
mistaking the victim for her sister. 57 In that case, the resemblance
between the sister and the victim, as shown through a living photo, had
relevance in the proceeding. The victim's appearance made it more
likely that the defendant had the ascribed motive, which was a material
fact. 58 Additionally, if a defendant claims self-defense, the size and
appearance of the attacker would be relevant, and a photograph of the
59
victim while alive could show this.
Often the purported relevance of a living-victim photograph in a
homicide case is that it identifies a previously living individual who is
no longer alive, and "[i]n every homicide case, the State must establish
the identity of the person killed."60 However, in many cases there are
crime scene photographs or testimony that have already established
this fact. Therefore, any (already low) probative value is further

54. FED. R. EVID. 401.
55. 383 A.2d at 160.
56. Even states that generally exclude living-victim photos will admit them when the image
has bearing on a fact relevant to the crime. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621
(1896) (finding a living picture of the deceased admissible to prove identity of victim when the dead
body was very decomposed); Commonwealth v. Scoggins, 353 A.2d 392, 396 (Pa. 1976) (upholding
admissibility of a victim of the photo while alive to corroborate testimony that the victim had a
claw left arm and was, therefore, physically incapable of having attacked appellant in the manner
alleged). This makes sense under traditional evidentiary doctrine, as when the photo proves or
disproves a material fact in issue it has relevance.
57. 506 A.2d 580, 602 (Md. 1986).
58. Id.
59. See Wilson, 162 U.S. at 621.
60. State v. Broberg, 677 A.2d 602, 610 (Md. 1996).
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discounted when this question is not at issue. 61 Additionally, if a
defendant is willing to stipulate the existence and identity of the victim,
the evidence's relative probative value is diminished or even
eliminated-it is no longer essential to proving anything at trial and
thus is not material. 62 Therefore, even when a living-victim photo may
have a small degree of relevance, its materiality is discounted by this
stipulation. 63 The photograph would then be cumulative and its
probative value weakened, setting it up to be excluded when balanced
against unfair prejudice, discussed in Section II.A.2.
Further weakening the relevance of living-victim photos is the
way they are often presented at trial. Though a photo may be proffered
as relevant proof of identity, the testimony elicited in connection with
64
living-victim photos normally goes beyond mere identification.
Instead, the photos are woven into testimony to humanize and create
empathy for the victim (and thereby create loathing for the
defendant). 65 For example, in State v. Broberg, the trial court admitted
two photographs of an eleven-year-old boy who was struck and killed by
a drunk driver. 66 One photo was his school portrait and the other
showed him in his little league uniform. 67 The identity of the victim was
not in dispute, but under identity reasoning, the Maryland Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's admission of the photos. 68 Further, the
identity rationale was not the reasoning put forward by the state at the
time of trial. 69 Instead, in advocating the admissibility of these
photographs, the state actually argued that because "the homicide
victim may be 'humanized' during the trial stage through the use of 'in
life' photographs ...

the State should be allowed to offer a 'glimpse of

the life [which the defendant] chose to extinguish.' "70
Similarly, in Ritchie v. State, the prosecution enlarged and
71
displayed a photo of the victim on a poster board throughout the trial.
61. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191 (1997) (finding error in admission of
evidence of a prior felony when the defendant stipulated to this fact and there were other, less
prejudicial means available to prove the point, including a stipulation).
62.

FED. R. EVID. 401.

63.

See Trautman, supra note 52, at 386.

64. See, e.g., Broberg, 677 A.2d at 613-14; Ritchie v. State, 632 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1981).
65. Broberg, 677 A.2d at 613-14; Ritchie, 632 P.2d at 1246.
66. 677 A.2d at 604.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 612.
69. Id. at 613 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original).
71. Ritchie v. State, 632 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981).
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The prosecutor then referred to the poster board when witnesses were
called. 72 This is a far cry from the mere establishment of the victim's
identity. Indeed, the appellate court, finding error, stated, "The jury
should not have been concerned with what the child looked like prior to
the offense committed against her .... The probative value of the
enlarged photo is questionable and could be highly prejudicial." 73 On
other occasions, living-victim photos have been admitted under the
guise of establishing identity but were then presented to the jury in a
before-and-after format, with the prosecutor comparing a photo of the
smiling, living victim to a gruesome autopsy or crime scene
74
photograph.
As such, identity reasoning, besides positing only marginal
relevance at best, is often mere pretext. When evidence is not used for
the proffered purpose for which it is found admissible, its relevance can
be weakened or extinguished-making otherwise relevant evidence
inadmissible. 75 Therefore, when living-victim photos are admitted
under the guise of proving identity, yet are instead used to elicit
emotionally charged testimony, their marginal relevance is lessened
76
and the relative unfair prejudice is heightened.
Finally, in discussing living-victim photos, some scholarship has
drawn false analogies to the relevance considerations of crime scene
and autopsy photographs. Such photographs undergo similar 403 rigor,
yet are often admitted unless unduly gruesome. 77 Postmortem photos,
however, generally play a fundamentally different role in trial and are
proffered for different reasons than are living-victim photographs, thus

72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
See People v. Stevens, 559 N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (N.Y. 1990) (criticizing the prosecution's

presentation of a living-victim photo next to an autopsy photo to show a comparison); People v.

Winchell, 470 N.Y.S.2d 835, 840-41 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (stating that admissibility of a crime
scene photograph of the victim does not create admissibility in a living-victim portrait).
75.

In State v. Bocharshi the court determined that autopsy photographs were relevant and

admitted them to show the angles of wounds; however, the prosecutor did not elicit testimony
concerning the angles or their significance. 22 P.3d 43, 49 (Ariz. 2001). Thus, even though the
photographs met the "bare minimum standard of relevance," because they were not used for the

proffered purpose, the court concluded that "they were introduced primarily to inflame the jury."
Id.
76. Id.
77. See Liesa L. Richter, Evidence: Is Oklahoma Balancing the Scales of Justice by Tying the
Hands of Trial Judges?: The 2002 Amendment to Section 2403 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code
MandatingAdmission of In-Life Victim Photographsin Homicide Cases, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 383, 400
(2003) (arguing against differing treatment of living and postmortem photographs in homicide
cases).
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78
justifying a different outcome under a relevancy and 403 analysis.
Postmortem photographs are truly evidentiary: they go to the
79
circumstances and cause of the crime for which the accused is on trial.
Unlike living photos, they often implicate the defendant and in many
cases elucidate the circumstances of the victim's death.8 0 In contrast,
living-victim photos, absent special circumstances, reveal nothing
about the nature of the crime, nor do they tie the defendant to the
conduct alleged.81 Thus, analogies to crime scene and postmortem
photos as a justification for the admissibility of living-victim photos,
82
though tempting, should be rejected.

2. High Unfair Prejudice
Once the relevance of proffered evidence has been determined, a
judge moves to the second prong of assessing admissibility-ensuring
that the evidence's probative value is not substantially outweighed by
its unfair prejudice. 8 3 The Rules Advisory Committee notes to Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 provide guidance on the threshold of impropriety,
stating, "Unfair prejudice within its context means an undue tendency
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not

78. This is not to say that gruesome crime scene photographs do not occasionally carry their
own attendant risks of unfair prejudice. For a thoughtful discussion of the role and use of deadvictim photographs, see Bandes & Salerno, supra note 15, at 1025.
79. E.g., People v. Herrera, 272 P.3d 1158, 1165 (Colo. App. 2012) ("Photographs
of victims illustrating the appearance of the victim's body at the scene of the crime or the nature
and location of the victim's injuries are generally relevant because they tend to show whether and
how the offenses were committed.").
80. See, e.g., People v. Stevens, 559 N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (N.Y. 1990) (noting that "photographs
of the victim's body showed the nature of the injury and therefore tended to prove that the
assailant acted with intent to inflict serious injury, an essential element of the manslaughter
count"); People v. Winchell, 470 N.Y.S.2d 835, 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) ("[T]he photographs were
relevant in that they exhibited a causative factor of death, the brassiere twisted around the
victim's neck, and demonstrated the inconsistency in defendant's testimony as to how he placed
the body under the garage. Despite their admittedly gruesome nature, the photographs were
probative of relevant issues and not presented solely to inflame the jury.").
81. Stevens, 559 N.E.2d at 1279 ("[T]he relevance of the portraits must be independently
established; the fact that photographs of the victim after death have been found to be relevant does
not necessarily establish the relevance, and hence admissibility, of portraits of the victim while
alive."). But see supra notes 56-59 (describing circumstances in which living-victim photos have
particular relevance).
82. The fundamental difference between living and postmortem photographs for evidentiary
purposes is fleshed out in the pre-Victim Life Photo Act case of State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641
(Tenn. 2013). Id. at 658 (holding that it was error to admit living-victim photographs while there
was no abuse of discretion in allowing admission of the crime scene photos).
83. See FED. R. EVID. 403; TENN. R. EVID. 403.
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necessarily, an emotional one."8 4 If the risk of unfair prejudice is
significantly greater than the evidence's probative value, then the judge
should use her discretion to exclude it.85 The test is balancing and
relative-the amount of prejudice sufficient to outweigh the evidence's
probativeness depends on the utility that evidence provides to the
evaluation of the issues in the case.8 6 For example, the level of prejudice
needed to substantially outweigh the probativeness of a murder weapon
is normally going to be higher than the amount of prejudice that would
lead to the exclusion of something such as flight evidence 8 7 -or, to the
point, a photo of the victim while alive. It is a sliding scale of which
judicial discretion is an integral part.8 8 Trial judges are given the power
and responsibility to make these determinations, balancing the oft89
competing goals of accuracy, fairness, and efficiency.
Assuming arguendo that a living-victim photograph meets the
scant minimum requirement of relevance, it should still normally be
excluded because its prejudicial nature would outweigh the
exceptionally low probative value. 90 Because a living-victim photo's
probative value is so low, the corresponding risk of unfair prejudice
need not be particularly high to properly lead to exclusion. 91 This is not
to say that the unfair prejudice is low-quite the contrary 92-but to
emphasize that even a modicum of unfair prejudice should be sufficient
to cause a living-victim photo to be excluded.
Though only a low risk of unfair prejudice would often be
sufficient to warrant excluding a living-victim photo, these photographs
84.

FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note (internal quotation marks omitted).

85. Id.
86. Calvin W. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence:
A Sliding Scale of Proof,59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 567 (1984) (describing this "sliding scale" of
unfair prejudice under 403). The inverse of this statement is also true. See Smith v. State, 98 A.3d
444, 453 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) ("In order to admit evidence of a highly incendiary nature, the
evidence must greatly aid the jury's understanding of why the defendant was the person who

committed the particular crime charged.").
87. Flight evidence, i.e., evidence that an alleged criminal fled from the scene of a crime or
from authorities, is generally considered to be quite weak. See Note, Rule 403 and the Admissibility
of Evidence of Flight in a Criminal Trial, 65 VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (1979) ("Because of the inherent
ambiguity of flight evidence, however, the Supreme Court has questioned the probative value even

of evidence of immediate flight.").
88.

Sharpe, supra note 86, at 567.

89. See infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text.
90. See Ritchie v. State, 632 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (finding error in
admission of photograph of victim while alive under a 403 rationale).
91. Sharpe, supra note 86 at 567.
92. See Ritchie, 632 P.2d at 1246 ("The probative value of the enlarged photo is questionable
and could be highly prejudicial. In a close case, on appeal, such a photograph may well tip the
scales in appellant's favor.").
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often carry quite a high risk of improper emotive considerations. 93 The
Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Rivers aptly summarized this
relationship:
The existence of [the victim] as a life in being was clearly established through the
testimony of various witnesses. The Commonwealth therefore did not need the
photograph to establish this fact. This photograph was introduced for the purpose of
engendering sympathy for the 94victim with the intent of creating an atmosphere of
prejudice against the defendant.

Another court noted unfair prejudice in living-victim photos, stating,
"The horror of the homicide can be equally evoked with a photo of a
victim who is a beautiful baby as it can be with gruesome death
'95
pictures. The emotional effect is as potentially damaging.
Finally, as discussed in Section II.A, living-victim photos are
often submitted by the prosecution precisely because the state hopes
that jurors will make their decision with their emotions instead of their
minds. 96 Supreme Court dicta from Justice Souter indicates that judges
at the highest level recognize the risk of unfair prejudice stemming from
living-victim photos. 97 In his concurring opinion in Carey v. Musladin,
Justice Souter discussed the inherent risks of allowing a victim's photo
to be displayed on buttons worn by spectators in the courtroom, noting:
[O]ne could not seriously deny that allowing spectators at a criminal trial to wear visible
buttons with the victim's photo can raise a risk of improper considerations. The display is
no part of evidence going to guilt or innocence, and the buttons are at once
an appeal for
98
sympathy for the victim (and perhaps for those who wear the buttons)."

The desire to show the suffering of survivors and thus engender
sympathy for those left behind was the primary, if not sole, motivation
of the Tennessee Voices for Victims campaign. 99 Indeed, the original
draft of the Tennessee Victim Life Photo Bill would have allowed the
victim's family to select the photo introduced at trial. 10 0 Allowing

93. See, e.g., id. (finding unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the photo's negligible
probative value); Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 160 (Pa. 1978) (same).
94. Commonwealth v. Rivers, 644 A.2d 710, 716 (Pa. 1994) (citations omitted).
95. Franks v. State, 636 P.2d 361, 366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (finding error in admission
of photo of victim baby while alive). Notably, however, in the aftermath of the victim life photo
legislation in that state, Oklahoma courts have retreated from this position, as discussed in Section
1I.B.
96. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
97. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 82-83 (2006) (Souter, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
100. The original draft of the bill stated that "[a] deceased victim's family has a right to have
a photograph, determined by the court to be a reasonable depiction of the victim prior to the crime,
be admitted during trial." See Victim Life Photo Bill, TENN. VOICES FOR VICTIMS,

1438

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:5:1423

prosecutors to directly appeal to the jury's emotions, which a photo
selected by a bereaving family would certainly do, is precisely the type
of consideration 403 seeks to eliminate from the jury box. 10 1
The combination of living-victim photographs' low relevance,
lack of materiality, and the attendant risks of substantial unfair
prejudice make statutory admissibility exceedingly problematic. The
motivation behind this legislation makes the use of these photos even
more dubious. Such images can invoke deep emotions of sympathy and
horror and have an incredible impact-which is exactly why families
want them shown and why prosecutors seek to introduce them into
evidence. 10 2 This same reasoning, however, is precisely why these
photos should be excluded or at least left to the sound discretion of the
presiding judge. This is not to say that one should not feel sadness and
sympathy for the victims of violent crimes; however, it is an undisputed
and well-accepted tenet of evidentiary law that these extralegal
considerations should have no place in the jury box.10 3 State-sanctioned
invocations of grief and outrage that seek the sympathy of the jury go
to the very heart of unfair prejudice.
a. Victims are Victims: Addressing Counterarguments
In Tennessee, victims that survive a crime have a constitutional
right to attend the trial of the accused, and, by this logic, there exists a
parallel argument that a photo of a homicide victim should be allowed,
as it personifies a person whose life was taken.1 0 4 Similar reasoning was
presented for the photo provision in the Utah Victims' Rights
Amendment.1 0 5 One article noted:
http://tnvoicesforvictims.org/calendar/victim-life-photo-bill/
(last visited Jan. 10,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/T5Y7-6W8B].
101. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 879, 897 (1988) ("[T]he concerns subsumed by the concept of 'prejudice' are probative
dangers that threaten to vitiate the fact-finding process itself.").
102. See supra notes 29-32, 64-72 and accompanying text.
103. Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The PrejudicialNature of Victim Impact Statements, 10
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 492, 501 (2004), http://people.uncw.edu/myersb/292/readings/readings/
victimo20impact.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EW5-JUFL] ("A well-established belief among legal
scholars and practitioners alike is that an emotional juror is an irrational juror.").
104. Joan Berry & Dave Clark, Guest Column: The Last Insult, OAK RIDGE TODAY (Mar. 23,
2015),
http://tnvoicesforvictims.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/The-Last-Insult.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5733-94EV] ("We want ... [to give] murder victims the same rights as victims of
other crimes. We want murder victims to be granted the opportunity to be present in the
courtroom.").
105. Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah's
Victims'Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1408 (1994).
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For victims, such statements [that living photos have low probative value] exemplify the
view that the criminal justice system is out of balance ....[D]efendants are, of course,
alive and present in the courtroom to establish rapport with the jury .... Yet while the
defendant is free to personalize his side of the case, the victim's family is not even given
the satisfaction of having the prosecution introduce a photograph of the victim to

personalize the life taken. 1 06

On its face this is a compelling narrative; however, it falsely analogizes
between a victim being able to be present in a courtroom and a
photograph being introduced as a piece of evidence. Courts have
recognized that "[i]n determining whether a jury has been unduly
influenced, there is an important distinction between the potential
impact of a 'state-sponsored' message and a message from private
citizens." 10 7 Jurors know it is the role of the judge to serve as gatekeeper
and ensure they do not take in improper considerations;1 0 8 therefore,
allowing a living-victim photo to be admitted as evidence necessarily
deems it as something to properly be considered in determining the
guilt of the accused.10 9 This is fundamentally different than an
individual or family member merely being present in the courtroom.
"The special influence of the imprimatur of the State is often troubling,"
and its impact on the jury should not be ignored.1 10
The desire to "personalize the life taken," no matter how
emotionally compelling, rests on an improper evidentiary basis. 1 It
does not take much imagination to envision how the grizzled defendant,
likely brought into the room in handcuffs, juxtaposed with an admitted
photo of the smiling, beautiful victim, would spur an emotional
response and possibly outrage members of the jury. These improper
11 2
considerations could deny the defendant a fair trial.
Additionally, the focus on the rights of the victim as an impetus
for this type of legislation misconstrues the very nature of criminal
proceedings.1 13 This observation is not to undermine the trauma or

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
State v. Lord, 165 P.3d 1251, 1254 (Wash. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect: The Impact of

Judges' Admissibility Decisions on the Persuasiveness of Expert Testimony, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB.

POL'Y & L. 1, 1 (2009) (finding that mock jurors were less critical in their evaluations of scientific
evidence when it was "admitted" by a judge than when presented with the same evidence outside
of the trial context).
111. Id.
112. See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
113. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 836 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Evidence about
the victim and survivors, and any jury argument predicated on it, can of course be so inflammatory
as to risk a verdict impermissibly based on passion, not deliberation.").
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tragedy of victims of violent crimes, but instead recognizes the larger
role of the criminal justice system-a criminal trial is not for the
vindication of individuals, but for society. Victims play a role in this,
but they are not parties to the trial-the defendant's opponent is the
State. 114 And finally, though the victims and survivors have been
impacted by the crime and the trial, the state has a duty to ensure due
11 5
process for the defendant-not the victim.
This tension between fairness to the defendants and victims'
rights has fleshed itself out in the role of victim impact statements in
the sentencing phase of trials. The Supreme Court notably reversed its
position on the Eighth Amendment barring such testimony in Payne v.
Tennessee in 1991.116 Though much scholarly attention was paid to the
Supreme Court's top-down reversal of its position on victim impact
statements,1 17 the bottom-up grassroots push for victim photos in the
guilt phase of murder trials has been largely overlooked. Living-victim1 18
photo legislation at the state level has (thus far) gone far less noticed.
The success of the victims' rights movement in obtaining admissibility
of these photographs could be even more problematic than victim
impact statements. Unlike the latter, living-victim photographs are
introduced as substantive evidence during the guilt phase of a homicide
trial before the defendant has been convicted.11 9 Often the testimony
elicited in connection with these photos forays beyond identity, as
discussed in Section II.A.1. The converse is also true-research
suggests that many jurors use victim evidence from the guilt phase of a
capital trial to determine what punishment is appropriate in the trial's

114. Myers & Greene, supra note 103, at 493 (discussing how victim impact statements are
inconsistent with the "notion that crime is a violation against the state rather than against
individual victims").
115. See, e.g., Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the ProsecutorialProcess, HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 357, 371-72 (1986) (noting the American "public prosecution" model in which the
criminal justice system serves the interests of society, not individual victims); see also Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) ("[A] citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the
prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution....
[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another.").
116. 501 U.S. at 830 (reversing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and allowing victim
impact statements during the sentencing phase of trials).
117. See, e.g., Roscoe Porter Field, Constitutional Law Payne v. Tennessee: The
Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements A Move Toward Less Rational Sentencing, 22 MEM.
ST. U. L. REV. 135, 156 (1991).
118. But see Richter, supra note 77, at 383.
119. See, e.g., Coddington v. State, 142 P.3d 437, 451 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (upholding
admission of a living-victim photograph during guilt stage of trial under Oklahoma victim photo
statute).
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sentencing phase. 120 Therefore, the picture painted (or shown) of the
victim during trial can be the difference between life and death for the
121
defendant.
This has significant implications, as there is research indicating
that defendant and victim attractiveness (or lack thereof) and race can
have a substantial impact on jury perception and the ultimate verdict
of a trial. 122 Allowing the prosecution (and the prosecution only 123) to
introduce these photos carte blanche enables one side to play up these
inherent, improper biases and exacerbate such systemic imbalances.
Justice Stevens acknowledged these biases in his dissent in Payne,
stating:
The fact that each of us is unique is a proposition so obvious that it surely requires no
evidentiary support .... Evidence offered to prove such differences can only be intended
to identify some victims as more worthy of protection than others. Such proof risks
decisions based on the same invidious motives as a prosecutor's decision to seek the death
penalty if a victim is white, but to accept a plea bargain if the victim is black. 124

This is reified when one takes into consideration that there are
currently 2,922 inmates on state death rows 125 while there are only
sixty-two federal death row inmates. 126 In 2014, there were a combined
694 homicides in the four states that currently have living-victim photo
statutes-Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Tennessee-with over half of
these homicides occurring in Tennessee. 127 All four of these states retain
120. Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worth and Unworthy
Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 371 (2003). Juries are typically only involved in sentencing in
capital trials; therefore, though they do not take part in all sentencing, they are involved in the
most high-stakes decisions.
121. See id. at 373 (finding the "victim factor" to play a significant role in capital sentencing
decisions).
122. See, e.g., David L. Wiley, Beauty and the Beast: Physical AppearanceDiscriminationin
American Criminal Trials, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 193, 211 (1995) ("Physical appearance
discrimination plays a substantive and all-too-frequent role in American criminal trials."); see also
Marsha B. Jacobson, Effect of Victim's and Defendant's Physical Attractiveness on Subject's
Judgments in a Rape Case, 7 SEX ROLES 247, 253 (1981) (finding a simulated jury more likely to
convict an alleged rapist when the victim is attractive).
123. Every state that has enacted a living-victim photo statute extends preferential treatment
only to photographs offered by the prosecution. A defendant may still be able to admit a photograph
of the victim under traditional evidence rationales, but cannot take advantage of the permissive
statute-thus defendants have to meet a higher threshold.
124. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 866 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 1, 2015), http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo. org/death-row -inmates -state-and-size-death-row -year [https ://perma.cc/CL6X6T8Z].
126. Federal Death Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (June 26, 2015), http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo. org/federal-death-row -prisoners [http s://perma.cc/QWB9-XLF3].
127. Uniform Crime Reports: 2014 Crime in the United States, FBI, https://www.fbi
.gov/ab out-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the -u.s/20 14/crime-in -the-u.s. -20 14/tables/table -4 [perma.cc/5J88-
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the death penalty. 128 Therefore, changes to the evidentiary code at a
state level to allow further focus on the victim, particularly for
traditional state crimes like homicide, should cause concern. The lesser
attention paid to these changes, however, could mean that these bills
are easier to enact and do not receive the proper pushback. 129 This is an
area in which concerns about fundamental fairness for defendants in
criminal trials must supersede notions of victims' rights.
B. Dabbling with Discretion
The Tennessee Victim Life Photo Act, like similar acts, has two
primary evidentiary consequences: (1) it declares that living-victim
photos of victims in homicides are relevant and thus pass 401 muster,
and (2) it exempts these photographs from the traditional 403
balancing.1 30
This section examines the consequences of this and similar
legislation on admissibility and discretion. First, this section
demonstrates that the plain legislative intent of victim photo statutes
is to eliminate discretion via 403 balancing as to admissibility of livingvictim photos. Second, this section uses the implementation of such
legislation in Oklahoma to demonstrate that even when judges
interpret these statutes to preserve discretionary 403 balancing, the
inquiry is toothless and creates a realm of 403 purgatory in which
living-victim photos are almost never excluded.
1. Intended Effect: 403 Elimination
It is clear that the Tennessee legislature passed the Victim Life
Photo Act with the intent of eliminating 403 balancing considerations
as to living-victim photos.13 1 This position is in accord with the position
of Tennessee Voices for Victims, the group that lobbied for the bill's
DC94] (last accessed Feb. 28, 2016) (showing "murder and nonnegligent homicide[s]" with 371 in
Tennessee, 175 in Oklahoma, 81 in Oregon, and 67 in Utah).
128. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty
[https://perma.cc/D8C4-QPBB]
(last
accessed Feb. 28, 2016). In the aftermath of a high-profile botched execution, Oklahoma prisoners
facing the death penalty (including the defendant in Glossip v. State, 157 P.3d 143, referenced in
this Note) challenged that state's death penalty by lethal injection; however, its legality was
upheld by the Supreme Court last term. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746 (2015).
129. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
130. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-103(c) (2015); TENN. GEN. ASSEMB. FISCAL REV. COMM.,
FISCAL
NOTE,
SB
166
(2015),
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Fiscal/SBO166.pdf

[https://perma.cc/S2BY-ER2C].
131. Fiscal Note, SB 166.
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enactment, and is further shown through legislative history and the
statute's mandatory language. Statements by bill supporters in the
legislature 132 as well as legislative committee reports reveal that state
legislators expected this bill's passage to make victim photos admissible
not subject to judicial discretion. 133

The report from the legislative Fiscal Committee regarding the
Victim Life Photo Act stated: "Under current law and rules of evidence,
a pre-crime photograph of a victim could be admitted into evidence if
the photograph is relevant and not overly prejudicial. A judge has
discretion over whether or not to admit the photograph."; however,
"[t]he proposed legislation would require the admission of a pre-crime
photograph if the victim is dead." 134 The language is clear-it
acknowledges that the prior discretion was a problem and states that
the purpose of the legislation is to require that these photos be
admitted. This shows plain legislative intent that these photos no
longer be subject to discretionary 403 balancing. 135
Additionally, the Tennessee Criminal Practice Guide has been
updated to reflect the new state of the law on living-victim
photographs. 136 It now reads: "With regard to a photograph of the victim
of a homicide taken while the victim was alive, the legislature has
specifically authorized the admissibility of 'an appropriate photograph
of the victim' in a prosecution for any criminal homicide." 137 The

legislature, therefore, has made clear that the Act creates admissibility
of living-victim photos, wholly eliminating the exercise of judicial
discretion under 403. Instead, the legislature has made living-victim
138
photographs per se admissible.
Interpretation of the Tennessee Victim Life Photo Act as
creating per se admissibility of these photographs is in line with other
states that adopted similar provisions prior to Tennessee doing so. 139
132. Rep. Rep. Ryan Haynes, co-sponsor of the bill, stated: "I don't see any reason why an
individual should not be able to have a photo of the victim introduced into evidence. That doesn't
seem to me to be a problem at all." Stephanie Beecken, Murder Victim's Mother Pleasedas Victim
Photo Bill Moves Forward in Tenn. Legislature, WATE 6 (Mar. 25, 2015), http://wate.com/
201 5/0 3/25/murder-victims-mother-pleased-as -photo -bill-moves-forward-in-tenn-legislature/
[https://perma.ccY6HZ-A3GR].
133. TENN. GEN. ASSEMB. FISCAL REV. COMM., supra note 130.

134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. W. MARK WARD, TENNESSEE CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE § 22:19 (2015-2016 ed. 2015)

(discussing unfair prejudice).
137. Id.
138. Indeed, the Oregon Supreme Court came to this conclusion in interpreting its version of
the Victim Life Photo Act. See State v. Williams, 828 P.2d 1006, 1012 (Or. 1992).
139. Id.
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The Oregon Supreme Court, analyzing that state's statute, held, "The
statute, in effect, declares the photographs to be relevant and not
subject to balancing under [Rule] 403."140 The court noted the
14 1
significant, nondiscretionary nature of the word "shall" in the statute.
It held that use of the word "shall" mandated inclusion of the evidence
without a discretionary 403 balancing process that would otherwise
apply.14 2 Therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court has openly
acknowledged that there is now a rule of per se admissibility for
14 3
photographs of victims while they were alive.
Now, instead of judges having the ability to make
determinations based on the factual circumstances of the case before
them, the photo's admissibility is legislatively predetermined. There
are significant institutional competency problems with evidentiary
determinations being made by legislators.1 4 4 Mandated admissibility of
in-life photographs can be seen as a "reassertion of legislative power in
this traditionally and structurally judicial space."14 5 However, courts
have generally deferred to the legislative judgment of lawmakers as a
justification for "constricting its own 403 review."1 4 6 In the Oklahoma
case of Marquez-Burrola v. State, for example, the Court stated,
"Appellant claims the amendment was a political move to appease
victims' rights advocates. This may be true, yet Appellant offers no
authority suggesting that a statute's constitutionality hinges on the
politics behind it."147 The admission of the in-life photograph was
14
upheld pursuant to the statute. 8
This is a dangerous situation for defendants, as there exists a
substantial risk of unfairness to parties when judicial discretion is
eliminated from a courtroom.1 4 9 Professor Edward Imwinkelried noted
this danger, stating, "It is imperative that any body of Evidence law
accord the trial judge a significant measure of discretion in applying the

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.;
see also State ex rel. Carlile v. Frost, 956 P.2d 202, 208 (Or. 1998) (stating that "[t]he

statute, in effect, declares the photographs to be relevant and not subject to balancing under OEC

403").
144. See Rosanna Cavallaro, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Struggle for
Rulemaking Preeminence, 98 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 56 (2007) (finding that Congress has
the ability to amend and create rules of evidence, but should refrain out of comity).
145. Id. at 37.
146. Id. at 70.

147. Marquez-Burrola v. State, 157 P.3d 749, 760 (Okla.Crim. App. 2007).
148. Id.
149. Imwinkelried, supra note 10 at 289.
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Rules." 150 This is because rulemakers, particularly nonjudicial
rulemakers, cannot anticipate the varied factual exigencies presented
in each case. 151 A judge should be able to make case-by-case
determinations and "adapt the evidentiary rules to the case as it unfolds
in her courtroom." 152 That is why discretion is viewed as "an
indispensable tool of the law of evidence." 153 Its elimination, therefore,
should not be taken lightly.
2. Actual Effect: 403 Purgatory
Although the purpose of living-victim photo statutes is to
eliminate judicial discretion, the actual effect in many cases has been
for judges to uniformly admit these photographs but insist that they
maintain discretion to exclude them. This concept is operationalized
here as "403 Purgatory."
Similar to Oregon's victim photo statute, the Tennessee and
Oklahoma statutes employ the mandatory "shall be admissible"
language, clearly indicating per se admissibility without 403 balancing,
while the Utah statute states a photograph "may" be introduced. 154 A
notable difference between the Utah and Oregon statutes and the
Tennessee and Oklahoma statutes is that the latter two states caveat
that "an appropriatephotograph of the victim" will be admissible when
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case. 155 The Oregon and Utah
statutes do not include the "appropriate" language. 156 This slight, yet
157
important, difference creates the additional risk of "403 purgatory."
The concept of 403 purgatory recognizes that in assessing whether a
photograph is "appropriate," judges may purport to exercise discretion
under the statute but consistently admit the proffered evidence without
158
meaningfully engaging in a 403 analysis.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see also Cavallaro, supra note 144, at 55-56.
152. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 289.
153. Id.
154. See supra note 3.
155. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-103(c) (2015) (emphasis added); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
2403 (West 2003) (same).
156. See supra note 3.

157. The term 403 purgatory, coined by the author, references the idea of an intermediate
state after physical death, but before entering paradise-what Encyclopedia Britannica terms
"postmortem suffering short of everlasting damnation." Purgatory, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA

ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/topic/purgatory-Roman-Catholicism (last visited Feb. 27,
2016) [https://perma.cc/F3PH-Y784].
158. The same risk likely exists with the use of "may" in the Utah statute; however, the author
has not been able to find a single case in which the Utah statute has been invoked.
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Unlike Oregon, Oklahoma decisions in the aftermath of that
state's living-victim photo act have claimed that trial courts retain the
discretion to exclude living-victim photographs for unfair prejudice
under traditional 403 considerations. 159 Oklahoma courts have held
"[t]he requirement that such photographs be 'appropriate' preserves the
trial court's discretion in determining admissibility." 160 The very case
that articulates this rule, however, notably allows admission of a livingvictim photograph that likely engendered substantial unfair
prejudice.161
In that case, Marquez-Burrolav. State, a husband was accused
of murdering his wife in a fit of jealous rage. 162 At his trial, the
prosecution introduced a seventeen-year-old photograph of the victim
in her wedding gown on her wedding day. 163 The prosecution elicited
testimony from the victim's (and defendant's) daughter to introduce the
164
photo and had her attest that it was indeed the victim, her mother.
Despite the prejudicial nature of the photograph and its having little to
no relevance, 165 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the
trial court's decision stating, "the photograph at issue did not unfairly
evoke sympathy for the victim so much as it underscored the tragic
nature of this crime for all involved." 166 "The lady doth protest too much,
16 7
methinks."
In another Oklahoma case, Hogan v. State, the defense similarly
challenged the admission of a graduation photo of the twenty-one-ye arold female victim, noting that at the time the crime occurred, livingvictim photos were consistently excluded by Oklahoma courts. 168 The
court rejected this argument, stating that in the interim the Oklahoma
legislature had enacted Oklahoma's living-victim photo statute, and
therefore the "in-life" photo should be admitted. 169 The defendant was
sentenced to death, and he was executed by lethal injection on January
159. Marquez-Burrola v. State, 157 P.3d 749, 761 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).
160. Id. at 760.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 758.
163. Id. at 759.
164. Id. at 761.
165. Id. at 767 (noting "[t]he evidence of a design to effect death was straightforward and
considerable").
166. Id.
167. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2.
168. Hogan v. State, 139 P.3d 907, 930 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).
169. Id. (finding that the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated by the application of a new
evidentiary rule in a capital trial for a crime committed before the evidentiary change and that it
was not excluded under 403).
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23, 2014.170 The court, by using the statute as the foundation for its
reasoning, showed that the decision flowed from the legislative
mandate and not from careful, balanced consideration of relevance and
prejudice. 171 This reinforces that, although the Oklahoma courts claim
to maintain 403 balancing discretion, traditional evidentiary tenets do
not actually underlie their decisions to admit such photographsindeed in Hogan there is almost no critical analysis of probative value
172
or unfair prejudice.
Oklahoma's claim that trial court judges retain the discretion to
exclude living-victim photographs for unfair prejudice under traditional
403 considerations does not reconcile with reality. Almost all of the
state's criminal cases excluded living-victim photos under 403 before
the statute went into effect, yet after its enactment these photos are
consistently admitted. 173 This 403 purgatory-legislative mandate of
admissibility but purported judicial preservation of 403-is consistent
with the general confusion that ensues when 403 is eliminated or
cabined by legislative decree. 174 A similar result has been observed at
the federal level with the enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence 413415, permitting admissibility of similar acts as evidence in crimes of
sexual assault despite Rule 404(b). 175 There, likewise, "court[s] struggle
to integrate the similar acts rules with 403,"176 particularly as
discretionary admissibility of evidence is an area "ordinarily governed
by a judicially determinable inquiry about relevance, probativeness,
and prejudice." 177 Now, like with past sexual misconduct, there is a
"presumption of probativeness" with victim photographs that "skews

170. See Hogan v. Trammell, 511 F. App'x 769, 776 (10th Cir. 2013) (upholding Hogan's death
penalty conviction); Justin Juozapavicius, Kenneth Eugene Hogan Executed; Convicted in 1988
Stabbing Death, HUFFINGTON POST

(Jan. 23,

2014),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/

01/23/kenneth-eugene-hogan-exec n_4655364.html [https://perma.cc/9U3R-Z6K8] (discussing the
execution).

171. Hogan, 139 P.3d at 930-31.
172. Id.; see also Glossip v. State, 157 P.3d 143, 157 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (upholding
admission of an in-life photograph of the victim, stating simply, "[t]he photograph met the
guidelines of the statute, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice").
173. Glossip, 157 P.3d at 143; Hogan, 139 P.3d at 931 (upholding admission of a photo of the
victim at his high school graduation).
174. See Cavallaro, supra note 144, at 65-66 (noting courts' uncertainty in applying 403 to
prior evidence of sexual misconduct which was made admissible under the Federal Rules by
Congress, similar to the photo statutes here).
175. Id. at 36; see also FED. R. EVID. 404 (banning past "crimes or other acts" to show action

in accord on this occasion).
176. Cavallaro, supranote 144, at 36.
177. Id. at 40.
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the 403 balance" with no more justification than that the legislature
promulgated a rule. 178 It is as if Oklahoma courts decided overnight that
such photos magically no longer carry a risk of unfair prejudice, though
179
they held the opposite position for decades.
Under living-victim photo statutes, trial judges feel compelled to
confront different situations in the exact same manner, whether under
the guise of 403 or not: carte blanche admissibility. Absent intervention,
Tennessee, whose statute is nearly identical to Oklahoma's, will likely
see the same result.1 80 Tennessee's state legislature made clear its
desire to have these photos admitted under the statute.1 8 1 Further, even
if judges engage in a strained reading of the statute to preserve a
specter of 403 balancing, evidence indicates that living-victim
photographs will likely overwhelmingly be admitted.1 8 2 Whether by
legislative history, the language of the rule itself, or by the confusion
created by the limitation on discretionary 403 balancing, Tennessee is
poised to move toward automatic admissibility of victim photos to the
detriment of considerations of fairness and verdict efficacy.
III: SOLUTION: USE IT OR LOSE IT
There are two options: either discretion has been preserved and
judges reviewing admissibility of living-victim photos should
meaningfully employ 403, or these statutes have eliminated discretion,
mandated admissibility, and should be invalidated as unconstitutional.
A. Use it: JudicialAssertion of Meaningful Discretion
One solution is for judges to meaningfully apply relevance and
403 unfair prejudice considerations, even in the face of a Victim Life
Photo statute. However, experience indicates that this approach can be

178. Id. at 67 (discussing this tilt in the context of rules 413-415).
179. See, e.g., Franks v. State, 636 P.2d 361, 366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (holding the livingvictim photo had low relevance that was outweighed by unfair prejudice).
180. Though their preambles differ, the operative language of the statutes is the same: "[I]n
a prosecution for any criminal homicide, an appropriate photograph of the victim while alive shall
be admissible evidence when offered by the district attorney to show the general appearance and
condition of the victim while alive." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2403 (West 2003); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-38-103(c) (2015).
181. See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 159-160, 173-179 and accompanying text.
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confusing and unworkable for judges. It also carries the particular risk
18 3
of 403 purgatory.
Several defendants in Oklahoma have appealed criminal
convictions by challenging the constitutionality of that state's Victim
Life Photo Act.18 4 These challenges, however, have been unsuccessful,
largely due to Oklahoma courts' insistence that they have preserved 403
balancing.18 5 The courts assert that, hypothetically, a trial court can
still exercise discretion in admission of living-victim photographs.18 6 As
discussed in Section II.B, however, the courts do not meaningfully
exercise this discretion and instead mechanically admit the photos in
accordance with the statute.
Therefore, for this to be a true solution, the preservation of
discretion must be in both word and deed. To avoid 403 purgatory,
Tennessee and states with similar statutes must subject proffered
photographs to a complete relevance and 403 analysis to ensure
fairness to criminal defendants. This would, however, require judges to
circumvent the statute's mandatory language (and clear legislative
intent) to allow complete exclusion of in-life photos when he or she finds
substantial unfair prejudice. No state with such a statute has thus far
demonstrated a baseline of complete exclusion.
There is, however, a chance that judges in Tennessee will
meaningfully preserve their discretion, even in light of contrary
statutory intent. When confronted with a similar statute purporting to
affect evidentiary rules, the Tennessee Supreme Court went out of its
way to read the legislation so as not to infringe on judicial discretion:
If strictly construed, [this law] would represent a legislative attempt to remove a judge's
discretion to determine what evidence is logically or legally relevant to an ultimate fact
of consequence. Moreover, to the extent that a strict interpretation of the statute's

mandatory language would preempt Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 404(b), the statute
would work to undermine, rather than to supplement, judicial determinations of logical
and legal relevancy. Nevertheless, . .. we will not lightly presume that the legislature
intended to usurp the role of the courts in exercising the judicial power of the state.

Indeed, because we give all legislative enactments a strong presumption of
constitutionality, we will presume that the legislature did not intend to infringe upon the

183. See supra notes 174-179 and accompanying text; see also Cavallaro, supra note 144
(discussing the judiciary's struggle in the application of 403 to determining admissibility of past
instances of sexual assault under rules 413-415).
184. Bosse v. State, 360 P.3d 1203, 1225 (Okla. Crim. App. 2015); Marquez-Burrola v. State,
157 P.3d 749, 760 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).
185. See, e.g., Bosse, 360 P.3d at 1225 ("We have previously rejected these claims, specifically
finding that the balancing test remains and applies to this clause after the statute was amended
to permit this type of evidence.").

186. Id.
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proper exercise of the judicial power in1this
state and that therefore, it did not intend for
87
courts to strictly construe this statute.

Thus, there is a possibility that Tennessee judges will take a similar
approach to the Victim Life Photo Act, especially because Tennessee
courts, like most courts, construe statutes to avoid a constitutional
1 88
conflict when possible.
Assertion of judicial discretion as a solution could expand beyond
pure exclusion. If a judge chooses to admit a proffered photograph,
careful attention to the mechanisms by which these photos are
introduced and the ways in which juries are instructed to use them
could also mitigate unfair prejudice even in light of admissibility. For
example, judges could restrict the introduction of photographs by
victims' family members testimony, as was the case in Marquez18 9 While this cuts against the underlying motivation for the
Burrola.
statute, the rights of the victims and their families, it could temper
improper emotional fervor within the jury. Another option would be for
judges to allow introduction of these photos purely for identification
purposes. This could mirror other evidence rules that allow otherwise
impermissible evidence to be admitted for a limited purpose, such as
the use of past criminal convictions to demonstrate witness credibility
(but not action in accord).1 90 Instructing the jury that the photograph
should be used purely for identification purposes, however, presents at
least two problems. First, there is abundant evidence indicating that
fact-finders are largely incapable of making these nuanced distinctions
of permissible and impermissible uses of evidence.1 91 Second, a jury
instruction pinpointing the proper use of a living-victim photo could
unwittingly draw additionalattention to its admission.

187. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 483 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted).
188. Marion Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Marion Cty. Election Comm'n, 594 S.W.2d 681, 684-85
(Tenn. 1980) (finding that when (1) a statute can legitimately be construed in various ways, and
(2) one of those constructions presents a constitutional conflict, then "[i]t is our duty to adopt a
construction which will sustain the statute and avoid [that] constitutional conflict, if its recitations
permit such a construction").
189. Marquez-Burrola,157 P.3d at 761; see supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
190. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (barring propensity reasoning); FED. R. EVID. 609 (allowing
evidence of past criminal convictions for witness impeachment).
191. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand:
The Effect of a PriorCriminalRecord on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 1353, 1389 (2009) (using data to show the "historical basis for allowing prior record
evidence-to challenge the defendant's credibility-has little empirical support," and juries use
this information as impermissible propensity reasoning); Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil
Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1988) (noting the
inflammatory nature of evidence of prior convictions, even if supposedly only used for credibility).

20161

LIVING- VICTIM PHOTOGRAPHS

1451

Ultimately, these suggestions as to excluding, limiting, and
controlling the way that the photographs are used implicate the
necessity of the judicial discretion-discretion that these statutes
sought to eliminate. The latitude and flexibility that discretionary,
traditional rules of evidence grant to trial judges, however, are not only
desirable, but are "indispensable tool[s] of the law of evidence" 192 that
are necessary to ensure defendants receive a fair trial. Thus, if
discretion can be resurrected it would provide a tenable solution.
B. Lose it: Victim Life Photo Statutes are Unconstitutional
Alternatively, Tennessee courts should determine that the
Victim Life Photo Act mandates admissibility and eliminates judicial
discretion, and thus unconstitutionally violates defendants' due process
rights.
The courts have an "essential duty ... to ascertain and carry out
the legislature's intent without unduly restricting or expanding a
statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." 193 Further, this
"legislative intent is to be ascertained from the plain and ordinary
meaning of the statutory language used."194 In Tennessee, examination
of the history and language of Victim Life Photo Act reveals that plainly
there is no legitimate intent to preserve 403 balancing concerns and
judicial discretion-the Act was expressly meant to eliminate judicial
discretion as to admissibility of living-victim photos. As one cannot
reasonably construe the statute to preserve the judicial discretion
through 403 balancing, the statute is constitutionally invalid and
1 95
should be struck down as violative of due process.
In the context of judicial review of criminal trials, due process
can be mushy, but at its core, due process seeks to ensure that
proceedings are fundamentally fair to a defendant.1 96 As Justice
Cardozo wrote, "Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall
be fair, but fairness is a relative, not an absolute, concept ....What is
1 97
fair in one set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in others."
This has particular salience in criminal law, because "as applied to a

192. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 289.
193. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tenn. 2001).
194. Id. (citing Qragg v. Qragg, 12 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Tenn. 2000)).
195. Notably, however, a Due Process challenge will likely only be effective if 403 balancing
considerations are held not to apply. See United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1988)
("[S]ubject to the protections of Rule 403, Rule 413 did not violate the Due Process Clause.").
196. Id.
197. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 117 (1934).
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criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. 1 98
Therefore, admission of evidence can violate due process even if it is not
false, because "[t]he aim of the requirement of due process is not to
exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false." 199
Violations of due process have been found when the prejudicial
effect of a piece of evidence substantially outweighs its probative
value. 200 Additionally, there may be a due process violation when clearly
irrelevant evidence is admitted. 20 1 Either of these situations is arguably
20 2
the case in many instances with living-victim photos of victims.
Further, the attendant risks of being convicted based on improper or
emotive considerations implicate fundamental fairness, the animating
principle of due process. 20 3 The introduction of a living-victim photo
might not rise to the level of a due process violation in all instances, but
where admissibility is mandated by statute, the discretion of a judge to
make the ex-ante determination that a photo is fundamentally unfair
is eliminated. Therefore, by making mandatory admissibility apply in
all instances, these statutes ensure that in at least some instances
rights will be violated. By tying the hands of judges, these states are
making a drastic, dangerous overcorrection to a perceived problem.
CONCLUSION

The victims' rights movement has slowly crept into the guilt
phase of homicide trials through the enactment of statutes that
mandate admissibility of photos of murder victims while they were
alive. By seeking to fix a perceived injustice to the surviving families of
homicide victims, legislators have jeopardized the due process of
defendants, and thus the viability of these laws, by creating blanket

198. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
199. Id.
200. See Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1988) (granting habeas relief where
prejudicial effective evidence so outweighed probative value that result was a denial of
fundamental fairness); Osborne v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing and
remanding a denial of habeas corpus petition on basis that prejudicial effect of evidence could have
risen to fundamental unfairness); Bisaccia v. Att'y Gen. of N.J., 623 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1980) (same).
201. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70 (1991) ("Concluding, as we do, that the prior injury
evidence was relevant to an issue in the case, we need not explore further the apparent assumption
of the Court of Appeals that it is a violation of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment for evidence that is not relevant to be received in a criminal trial.").
202. See supra Section H.A.
203. Id.
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rules that apply in all situations. Those 403 analyses carried out under
the specter of Victim Life Photo Acts do not truly address questions of
probativeness and unfair prejudice. Instead, in these instances, judges
frequently defer to the decisions of absent legislators who have
appeased their constituents and turned to their next crusade. It is the
judge's role to be the gatekeeper of evidence, and thus, judges should
exercise their power to declare that these laws are in violation of due
process.
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